Background: Our research assumes that the software quality affects the product validity. This assumption also refers to embedded software. Objectives: This paper analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the consumer is the leader and the producer of embedded software is the follower. Methods/Approach: A comparative statics analysis of a producer's reaction is carried out and confirms our intuition that the product price is positively correlated to the number of employees and the software quality. Results: An increase in wage has an adverse effect on producer's reaction. Derived results are illustrated numerically and Stackelberg and cooperative equilibrium are compared. It is shown that the welfare loss is smaller with higher quality software for any number of employees. Conclusions: Although the equilibrium involves less employed workers, the optimal software quality is higher. The optimal product price is lower, which puts the consumer and the producer in a better position.
Introduction
Embedded systems are one of the technologies that have great market potential with the possible large areas of further improvement. Embedded systems consist on interconnected hardware and software, and are important emerging market (Schlett, 2000) with the great prospect for growth as well with number of possible implementations (Dey, 2010 ; BCC Research, 2012; Lakka et al., 2012) .
Goal of the paper is to find equilibrium in the Stackelberg model in which the relationship between the client and the producer of embedded sofwer is analysed (Bierman, 1993; Jehle, 2001 ; Mas-Collel, Whinston, Green, 1995). In the Stackelberg leadership model the follower firm acts like in the Cournot model and for the given level of production of the leader firm determines its own production level which maximizes economic profit (Simaan, Cruz, 1973; Fudenberg, Tirole, 1992; Osborne, Rubinstein, 1994) . The leader firm chooses quantity knowing that the follower firm will react to it according to its reaction function. The product quality affects the likelihood of product safety and the consumers' utility but depends on the invested effort. The goal is to find equilibrium in the Stackelberg model where the client is the leader, and the producer is the follower.
In the first step, the producer chooses the number of units of labour for the given price of a product in order to maximize the expected profit. In this way the producer indirectly affects the software quality. In the paper the effect of the product price change on producer's reaction is analysed. The comparative statics results confirm our intuition. The higher the product price, the greater the level of labour units employed by the producer and the better the product. Increase in labour costs has opposite effect on the producer's decision. In the second step the consumer determines the product price in order to maximize his or her expected utility. This decision is affected by the producer's reaction or the price effect on the product quality. The consumer's utility and the software quality are usually directly related in the existing literature. In this paper, this relationship is complemented by the probability of product safety.
Theoretical optimization models which are solved by the client and the producer are illustrated numerically and the total welfare in the Stackelberg and the cooperative equilibrium is compared. The effect of the change in relationship between the employed labour units and the software quality on the given results is analysed. According to our numerical example, the more favourable this relationship is, the higher is the client's and the producer's welfare in the Stackelberg equilibrium. Even though fewer workers are employed, produced software is better. The total welfare loss is smaller due to more dominant effect of more favourable relationship between employees and the software quality in the Stackelberg equilibrium than in the cooperative equilibrium. Given the sensitivity of the results, future research should be devoted to examining the functional relationship between given variables in specific phenomena. The cost of software maintenance could also be taken into account. 
Model formulation


. It is assumed that the preferences of a consumer who uses valid product are described by the quasilinear utility function
, where m is the composite commodity good. Expression ) (q u is then a concave function describing how software quality affects consumer's utility. It is assumed that there is no benefit from completely unprofessional software,
which is illustrated in Figure 1 . consumer's wealth. Since for quasilinear preferences consumer's wealth doesn't affect his or her decisions, it is omitted from the analysis. For the product which does not work properly the consumer does not pay.
The consumer's expected utility is equal to
Let w denote the potential mass of wages which describes the amount that the producer would spend on wages when employing a working potential. Let
denote part of a working potential that the producer employs. Then the mass of wages is described by the expression we . The producer earns income only if the product works. This income is equal to the price of the product. The expected profit of the producer is described by the following expression (2) It is assumed that the software quality is an increasing function of the employed labour units,
. Furthermore we assume that the consumer or a client first determines the price of a product which the producer then takes into accounts and for given value of price maximizes the expected profit,
We seek the Stackelberg equilibrium where the consumer is the leader, and the producer is the follower. The producer's reaction function ) , ( * w p e describes the optimal number of labour units which maximizes producer's profit. By choosing the product price, the consumer indirectly affects the quality The consumer takes into account the producer's reaction and maximizes his or her expected utility (5) In this Stackelberg model the sensitivity of the problem's solution to changes in its parameters is examined.
Comparative static analysis
If the problem has interior solution, the producer derives the reaction function from the first order necessary conditions
Second order necessary conditions are as follows (7) First order necessary conditions can be understood as an identity (8) By deriving it with respect to product price we get . 0
From the first order necessary conditions it follows that the expression Taking into account the second order necessary conditions leads to the following conclusion
This comparative statics result confirms our intuition that the higher the product price, the more labor units the producer will hire which will produce high-quality software. Notice that ) , ( 
Numerical example
If we normalize the potential mass of wages, 1  w , the product price, the expected consumer's utility and the expected producer's profit are then expressed in terms of the potential mass of wages. Let's assume that the function which expresses the influence of software quality on consumer's utility is represented by the following expressionu 2 ) (  , the probability of product validity with embedded software is represented by the function 
The goal function is a concave function in the share of a hired working potential. If the problem has an interior solution, from the first order conditions represented by the following expression Thus, as long as the product price is not greater than twice the mass of potential wages, increase in prices increases software quality. In the second step, based on producer's reaction, consumer determines the price that maximizes his or her expected utility, 
it follows that the optimal product price which is determined by the consumer is 
Comparison of Stackelberg and cooperative equilibrium
In the cooperative equilibrium the total expected consumer's and producer's utility is maximized (20) In the example from the previous section, this problem is 
The goal function in this optimization problem is concave and reaches its extreme when the producer hires all workers . In order for a consumer to accept the cooperative equilibrium, this utility shouldn't be less than the expected utility in Stackelberg equilibrium, 
Similarly, the producer accepts the cooperative equilibrium if his or her profit isn't less than the expected profit in Stackelberg equilibrium,
Thus, the cooperative equilibrium is described by the highest quality software and the price from an interval
. This interval describes the space for client-producer negotiation in the cooperative equilibrium. Its size is equal to the total welfare loss in Stackelberg equilibrium in relation to the cooperative equilibrium. Now consider how the changes in employees-software quality relationship affect the obtained results. Let's assume that 
Conclusion
In this paper the relationship between the producer of embedded software and the consumer is analysed using Stackelberg leadership model in which the consumer is the leader and the producer is the follower. It is assumed that the software quality is affected by the number of employees and that the producer maximizes the expected profit. It is also assumed that the software quality affects the product validity. The comparative statics analysis confirms our intuition that the higher the product price, more workers are employed and better software is produced. Adverse effect on producer's reaction has an increase in wage. Based on producer's reaction, the consumer determines the product price which maximizes his or her expected utility.
Derived results are illustrated by a numerical example in which Stackelberg and cooperative equilibrium are compared and the welfare loss is determined. This loss is smaller with higher quality software for any number of employees. Although less employed workers are involved in equilibrium, optimal software quality is higher. Optimal product price is lower what brings the consumer and the producer in better position. Future research will be devoted to derivation of general relationship between the software quality, probability of software validity, number of employees and the product price where the cost of software maintenance should also be taken into account.
